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This paper studies the interactions of fiscal and monetary policy when they stabilise a single 
economy against shocks in a dynamic setting. We assume that fiscal and monetary policies both 
stabilise the economy only by causing changes to aggregate demand. Our findings are as follows. 
If  the  both  policymakers  are  benevolent,  then  the  best  outcome  is  achieved  when  the  fiscal 
authority allows monetary policy to perform nearly all of the burden of stabilising the economy. If 
the monetary authorities are benevolent, but the fiscal authorities have distorted objectives, then a 
Nash equilibrium will result in large welfare losses: unilateral efforts by each authority to stabilise 
the  economy  will  result  in  a  rapid  accumulation  of  public  debt.  However,  if  the  monetary 
authorities are benevolent and the fiscal authorities have distorted objectives, but there is a regime 
of fiscal leadership, then the outcome will be very nearly as good as it is in the regime in which 
both policymakers are benevolent. 
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  11  INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1  From Three-Equation Macroeconomics to a Five-Equation Setup 
 
Thinking about macroeconomic policy has been transformed in the past ten years. Nearly all of us 
now  analyse  short-run  macroeconomics  using  a  simple  three-equation  system.  This  system 
contains an IS curve, a Phillips curve, and something like a Taylor-type rule for monetary policy. 
It was explained in a paper by Svensson (1997) and Ball (1999)
1, and was applied to the UK in a 
simple, clear, paper by Bean (1998). This setup contains no fiscal policy.   
 
In this paper we introduce endogenous fiscal policy. We do this by adding a Taylor-type rule for 
fiscal policy, and also adding an equation which tracks the evolution of public debt. We show that 
one can use the resulting five-equation system to analyse the interactions of monetary policy and 
fiscal policy. For expositional purposes we set up our model in a backward-looking manner, 
which makes it particularly simple.
2 We believe that the three results established in the present 
paper  will  also  be  true  in  a  “best-practice”,  fully  micro-founded  model,  in  which  there  are 
forward-looking elements.  
 
In what follows we first consider the interaction of simple rules for both monetary policy and 
fiscal policy in this five-equation system. We then turn to investigate the games played between 
optimising monetary and fiscal policymakers.  
 
Our whole investigation is driven by the following single, but fundamental, observation. The 
experience of best-practice Central-Bank independence teaches that we can safely assume that the 
monetary authority is farsighted and does not aim for excess output.  By contrast, the lack of 
delegation of fiscal policy to an independent agent means that, as a result of political pressure, 
fiscal policymakers are likely to (i) discount the future too much, and/or (ii) aim for excess output. 
 
This paper establishes that, under these circumstances, the following three things are true. 
 
First,  the  best  outcome  is  achieved  if  the  fiscal  authorities  and  monetary  authorities  are 
benevolent,  and  cooperate  with  each  other  in  the  setting  of  their  macroeconomic  policy 
instruments.  We  show  that,  in  this  case,  the  fiscal  authorities  will  allow  monetary  policy  to 
perform nearly all of the burden of stabilising the economy in the face of shocks. 
 
Second,  we  show  that  very  nearly  exactly  this  same  good  outcome  will  occur  if  the  fiscal 
authority is able to act as a Stackelberg leader, even if the fiscal authority discounts the future too 
much, and/or desires to aim for excess output. This is because, roughly speaking, fiscal leadership 
will mean that the fiscal authority will acknowledge that the monetary authority will be able to 
prevent its fiscal policy from having “stupid” effects. As a result it will decide not to be stupid, 
even if (i) and/or (ii) are true. Hughes Hallett (2005) concludes that for the UK, the evidence is 
                                                   
1   The classic paper is that by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) , which contains a forward-looking Phillips 
curve, unlike the model in present paper.  
2  See Allsopp and Vines (2000), Carlin and Soskice (2005), Romer (2000), and Taylor (2000),  for other user-
friendly expositions of this setup. 
  2supportive of this "Stackelberg interpretation of the Treasury's strategy". This is why we support 
Gordon Brown’s fiscal policy framework for the UK.  
 
Third, we show that if the fiscal authority plays Nash, then social welfare will be harmed, and 
possibly greatly harmed, if the fiscal authority discounts the future too much, and/or desires to 
aim  for  excess  output.    This  is  because,  if  the  fiscal  authority  plays  Nash,  then  it  does  not 
acknowledge that the monetary authority will be able to prevent its fiscal policy from having 
stupid effects. It will thus decide to play “stupid” if either it discounts the future or it aims for 
excess output. But the monetary authority will respond and will overturn its play. We show that, 
in response to an inflation shock, this can lead to monetary contraction, and then redoubled fiscal 
effects  to  expand;  it  will  thus  lead  to  fights  between  the  fiscal  authority  and  the  monetary 
authority, fights which are possibly very costly. It is clearly the case that, in Europe at present, the 
twelve fiscal authorities cannot play the role of Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis the ECB. Hughes 
Hallett (2005) concludes that for the EMU, the evidence suggests “weak monetary leadership - or 
more likely, a straightforward non-cooperative game”. That is why we are critical of the current 
arrangements for fiscal and monetary policy within EMU. 
 
1.2  Plan of this paper 
 
We proceed as follows. Section 2 sets out what we need to know about three-equation Taylor-rule 
macroeconomics. Section 3 shows how we can build on this, to create a five-equation system, and 
studies the effects of simple policy rules in such a system. We use this setup in Section 4 to study 
interactions between optimising fiscal and monetary authorities, and present simulations of policy 
games played between them. It is these simulations which establish our three key results.  
 
Clearly, our aim in this paper is to discuss fiscal and monetary policy interactions, using dynamic 
models which build on three-equation Taylor-rule macroeconomics. By contrast with this, the 
existing  literature  on  monetary  and  fiscal  interactions  concentrates  almost  entirely  on  static 
models. It is most helpful to describe those models after we have described the outcomes from our 
own dynamic models (rather than describing the work of others on fiscal-monetary interactions at 
the beginning of the paper, as most authors would do). This way we are able to compare the 
outcomes  which  can  be  obtained  from  studying  these  two,  rather  different,  sorts  of  models. 
Section 5 presents this comparison of outcomes.  
 
In that section we first compare our findings with those of a widely-cited paper by Dixit and 
Lambertini (2003). We show that this paper points directly towards the three results of our paper, 
although that is not how the authors themselves describe their findings. We also discuss an early 
paper by Blake and Weale (1998), and show that those authors anticipate our third result. In 
addition we mention papers by Adam and Billi (2005) and Hughes Hallet (2005). In both of these 
papers there is a discussion of the effects of public deficits on fiscal and monetary interactions, 
effects which are critical for our own results.  
 
  3Section 6 summarises the findings of the paper. 
 
 
2    THREE-EQUATION TAYLOR-RULE MACROECONOMICS  
 
In this section of the paper we set out the three-equation Taylor-rule system - in which there is an 
IS curve, a Phillips curve, a Taylor rule for monetary policy, and no active fiscal policy.  We also 
explain some ideas about dynamic control, since these will be useful in later sections of the paper. 
For the definition of variables, see Appendix A. 
 
2.1  The Dynamic Three-Equation Model  
 
The first equation is an IS curve, showing the evolution of the output gap ( ), driven by the real 
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where  t %  is a demand shock. As discussed by Woodford (2003), an equation like this can be 
obtained from the optimising behaviour of individuals who choose consumption, given a budget 
constraint. 
 
The second equation is an accelerationist Phillips Curve. This describes the dynamics of inflation 
( t & ) in terms of past inflation and the output gap:  
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where  t (  is an inflation shock.  
 
In these two equations, the real interest rate is taken to be the instrument of monetary policy, and 
it affects output with a lag of one period. It then takes output another period to affect inflation. 
Following Bean (1998) we assume that there is inertia, or “persistence”, in output
3 as well as in 
the inflation process.
4 Despite its simplicity this model has been widely used to understand the 
basic mechanisms of monetary policy. In what follows we will use the calibration discussed in 
Appendix A which leads to the following values for parameters:  0.5   #  ,  1.0 ! #  and  0.1 ' # . 
As discussed in the appendix, these parameters are conventional in the literature.  
 
The dynamic structure of the model means that some aspects of policy must be thought about 
intertemporally. In particular, the accelerationist nature of the Phillips curve makes the control of 
                                                   
3  Bean included a lagged output term in the IS curve for empirical reasons. A micro-founded approach might 
motivate such a lagged term in the IS curve by appealing to habit persistence in consumption. 
4  We shall, see below that the coefficient of unity on lagged inflation in the (accelerationist) Phillips curve 
gives that equation a unit-root process, which is vital in what follows. It is possible that the IS curve could be written 
in the same way, if consumption were assumed to follow a forward-looking Euler equation. But that amendment 
would not affect the analysis which follows in the present paper.   
  4inflation shocks ( t ( ) a dynamic problem of sacrifice. There is a trade-off between the pain of a 
recession in the present and the benefit of disinflation in the future. But the pain is temporary: the 
equilibrium level of output is independent of the position adopted along this trade-off.   
 
By  contrast,  in  this  system,  other  aspects  of  policy  do  not  need  to  be  thought  about 
intertemporally.  The  control  of  demand  shocks  ( t % )  is  not  a  dynamic  problem.  Once  the 
policymaker  sees  the  effects  of  a  demand  shock,  and  identifies  that  they  are  indeed  the 
consequences of a demand shock, then the policy-maker should cut the interest rate in order to 
remove the effects of, say, a negative demand shock on the economy.  In the control of such 
demand shocks, there is not a dynamic trade off between current sacrifice and future benefit, 
although, it does take one period to remove such shocks. 
 
2.2  A “Satisfactory” Taylor Rule in the Three Equation Model 
 
Taylor (1993) famously demonstrated that actual US monetary policy could be well described by 
a simple rule that relates the real interest rate
5 to inflation and to output, with parameters  & )  and 
y ) respectively:  
 
t t r & y t y ) & ) # $                     (3) 
 
The first term in the Taylor rule shows that if inflation rises, then the real interest rate will be 
raised  to  weaken  demand,  which  will  reduce  inflation.  The  second  term  shows  that  the  real 
interest rate is raised if output rises.  
 
We now describe what happens if a Taylor rule of the form (3) is applied to the system consisting 
of equations (1) and (2), in response to impulse shocks to inflation and to demand, using the 
parameters  & ) = 1.1 and  y )  = 0.6 
 
We can see that, because of the persistence of inflation, it takes time to get inflation down after a 
shock, during which time interest rates must remain above base. It also takes some time to remove 
the effects of a demand shock, because of the lag in the effect of the interest rate in the IS curve 
and the persistence of output, and also because a transient output shock causes inflation,  which 
then takes time to remove. 
  
                                                   
5  Taylor stated  his rule as a rule for the nominal interest rate, but it is helpful to translate it into a rule for the 
real interest rate. This is possible because the real interest rate is here defined as the nominal interest rate minus the 
current inflation rate, which the monetary authority is able to observe.  
  5 
Figure 1: Impulse Responses 
 
Different values of  & )  and  y )  give different outcomes. If  y ) = 0, then we clearly require  & )  > 0 
for stability
6. But there may be problems if  & )  is large. If inflation is above target at t=0, then a 
large value for  & )  will cause a large interest rate increase and so a large reduction in output, but, 
because of the lag in the IS curve,  not until t=1. The output lag in the Phillips curve means that 
this will not cause a reduction in inflation until t=2. This lagged response means that inflation may 
overshoots  below  target,  and  then  converge  in  a  cyclical  manner.  That  is,  technically,  the 
eigenvalues of the system under control of such rule can become complex
7. A positive value for 
y )  can prevent such overshooting, and so can ensure an outcome like that shown in Figure 1.  
Roughly speaking, this extra term is helpful because output is a predictor of future inflation; it 
causes the policymaker to lower the real interest rate when output has fallen, without waiting for 
the reduction in inflation which the fall in output will cause.
 8  Figure  2 shows – to the right of the 
dotted  line  –  combinations  of  & )   and  y )   such  that inflation  control  is  both stable  and  non-
cyclical.  Figure  2  also  shows  that  the  value  of    & )   =  1.1,  which  was  used  to  compute  the 
                                                   
6  The principle “if there is a sustained increase in inflation by k%, then the nominal interest rate should rise by 
more than k% (i.e. the real rate of interest should rise)” has become known as Taylor principle. A similar interest-rate 
rule was proposed long ago by Wicksell (1907).  
7  It is possible to show formally that cycles can arise, even without output persistence, i.e. even if   = 0. It is 
also possible to show that, with   > 0, the system can even become unstable, for values of  & ) larger than those shown 
in this figure.  
8  Allsopp and Vines (2000) discuss this issue in detail and provide a diagrammatic analysis. 
  6outcomes in Figure 1, would produce cyclical outcomes unless  y )  is greater than approximately  
0.3. 
 
To summarise, a Taylor rule, with coefficients corresponding to a point to the right of the dotted 
line  in  Figure  2,  will  control  our simple  model  economy  in  what we will  call  a satisfactory 




Figure 2: Cyclicality boundary for Monetary Policy 
 
2.3  Optimal Monetary Policy in the Three Equation Model 
 
But how would we control this simple economy in an optimal manner?  
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9  This simple loss function is conventional. A formula similar to this,  but not identical, can be derived from 
the utility function of a representative agent,  reflecting the fact that, deep down, inflation matters because it distorts 
consumption and labour supply decisions across time, and so has quite complicated effects on the agent’s utility. See 
Woodford (2003), Steinsson (2003); Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005) discuss this issue in some detail. 
  7where   denotes expectations conditional on information available at time zero. Every period, 
the loss function penalises deviations of inflation from its target (here zero for simplicity), and of 
output from its target, 
  !
y , where  y  denotes the extent to which the output target is in excess of its 
potential (natural) level. The parameter   denotes the relative weight given to deviations of output 
from target; we use the conventional value of  0.5.  (See for example Aizenman and Frenkel, 
1985.) Future losses are discounted at the rate !. When there is no excessive discounting, and no 
aiming for excess output, !=0.99 and  y  =0.  
 
Optimal monetary policy can be found by minimising loss function  (4), subject to equations (1) 
and (2). Notice that the model represented by equations (1) and (2) contains two, and only two, 
lagged states, namely "t-1 and yt-1 . Using a standard theorem in control theory (see Chow, 1975), 
the optimal controller for such a system will be a feedback on both of these lagged states. But, 
because of the impact-lag of monetary policy, this is exactly what is achieved by the Taylor rule. 
There are thus values of  & )  and  y )  such that the Taylor rule (3), which has these parameters, is 
exactly  the  solution  to  the  minimisation  of  (4),  subject  to  (1)  and  (2).  That  Taylor  rule  will 
describe optimal monetary policy. The parameters  & )  and  y )  for the optimal rule will clearly 
depend on the parameters of the model,  , #, and $.  They will also depend on the parameter   
which describes the preferences of the policymaker.
10 The values for  & )  and  y )  which were used 
to compute the outcomes shown in Figure 1 are  in fact the optimal ones, for the values of   , #, $, 
  and ! that we have chosen.  Bean (1998) demonstrates that  & )  and  y ) will both be higher, the 
lower is  . Despite this, Bean also shows, strikingly, that the variability of inflation and variability 
of output, and so the welfare outcomes, will not be greatly influenced by  .
 11  
 
The optimal solution will deliver fast convergence to equilibrium (so that the terms in the infinite 
sum (4) are rapidly damped). Formally, the speed of convergence can be described by the absolute 
value of the biggest stable eigenvalue of the system under control. However, the optimal solution 
cannot converge too fast, as this might require too much sacrifice of output in initial periods after 
the beginning of stabilisation. The weight - in the loss function (4) defines the preferences of the 
policymaker on this matter. The optimal solution is also likely to have no cycles, because cycles 
increase the variability of economic variables, which would be penalised by the loss function (4). 
It is of course possible, that a fast-converging solution could nevertheless also have complex 
eigenvalues, and so exhibit rapidly converging, but cyclical, behaviour. But that turns out not to 
be the case in the present, simple, model. For this model the optimal controller is a member of the 
(large) set of what we have called “satisfactory” controllers. We can see, in Figure 2, that our 
optimal values of  & ) = 1.1 and  y )  = 0.6 correspond to a point to the right of cyclicality boundary. 
 
 
                                                   
10  Bean (1998) shows how to compute this optimal control rule analytically for the case in which !=1, and 
Henry et. al. (2006) show how to do this when ! is less than unity. 
11  See Henry et. al (2006) for a discussion of the reasons for this. 
  82.4  Solving the Problems of an Excess Output  Target and of Discounting 
 
Finally, we describe two important difficulties which must be dealt with, if there is to be a good 
monetary policy. 
 
First, it is necessary that monetary policy solves the problem of inflation bias, a problem, which 
stems from having an excessive output target,  y , and which was first described by Kydland and 
Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983).  In the backward-looking model being used here, if 
inflation is initially low, then, if  y >0, the policymaker has an incentive to increase output above 
zero, and will do this until inflation has risen to such a high level that y>0 is no longer attractive. 
That incentive thus causes an inflation bias
12.  
 
Second, it is necessary that the policy-maker does not discount the future excessively, i.e. it is 
necessary  that  !  be  close  to,  or  equal  to,  unity.  For  any  given   ,  the  more  the  policymaker 
discounts the future (i.e. the smaller is !) the more she will seek to postpone the recession which 
is necessary to deal with an inflation shock. That is because such delay will cause the recession to 
happen at a time in the future when she cares less about it. As a result, although discounting will 
not cause a permanent inflation bias, it will cause disinflation to happen too slowly.
 13  
 
The first-best solution to these problems is to delegate monetary policy-making to a “responsible” 
central banker, who will not target an excessive level of output and who will not discount the 
future.
14 Both John Vickers in the UK and Alan Blinder in the US have argued that the success of 
the MPC in the UK, and of the Federal Reserve Board in the US, is due to the fact that the 
monetary policy-makers in the UK and the US are of this kind.
15 (See Vickers, 1998, and Blinder, 
1997, 1998.) In the UK, the MPC process has ensured that members of the committee are of the 
kind  who  do  not  target  excess  output  or  discount  the  future,  partly  because  they  have  a 
professional reputation to defend, and partly because an inflation forecast is published along with 
the minutes of MPC meetings, in which there is a clear description of the policies which are 
required  to  get  inflation  back  onto  target,  and  of  how  and  when  they  will  be  adopted.  It  is 
important for the feasibility of this “solution” that the time scale for monetary policy, in which 
inflation is brought under control at an optimal speed, is likely to be short. Practical experience 
suggests that we are talking about periods in the range one to three years. (See Figure 1, in which 
inflation is halved within 8 quarters of the occurrence of an inflation shock.) 
 
                                                   
12  Barro and Gordon (1983) originally presented this story in a forward-looking but static model. See Clarida, 
Gali and Gertler (1999) for an alternative exposition.  
13  The literature has focussed on the “excess-output-target” problem, and very little has been written about the 
problem caused by excessive discounting by monetary policy-makers. But for such an argument, see Henry et al 
(2006). 
14  In a setup in which, unlike in (2), the Phillips curve is partly or wholly forward-looking, it will be important 
to be able to trust  that the central banker does not target excess output and does not discount the future.  That trust will 
enable the banker to be able to promise not to do either of these things, and the private sector will be able to know that 
there is not a time-inconsistency  problem, in which the central banker promises to do one thing and then does another. 
That will make the economy easier to control. Because the model in this paper is backward-looking, these (important) 
issues cannot arise here.  
15  And that they are trusted to be of this kind.  
  9It is possible that such a responsible central banker cannot be found i.e. it is possible that the act 
of delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank is not, in itself, sufficient to solve 
the inflation-bias problem.
 The literature has attempted to find various mechanisms that can try to 
achieve second-best or third-best outcomes in these circumstances. These include appointing a 
Rogoff (1985) Conservative Central Banker, who has more inflation aversion than society (i.e. a 
lower  ). An alternative, analysed by Svensson (1997), is to give the central bank an inflation 
target which somehow exactly offsets this inflation bias. It appears that the design of the European 
Central Bank was strongly influenced by the belief that this issue would remain a difficulty within 
EMU. 
 
3  FIVE-EQUATION MACROECONOMICS-WITH-FISCAL-POLICY  
 
3.1  The Dynamic Five-Equation Model  
 
We now add fiscal policy to the model, by adding a description of the behaviour of the fiscal 
policy authority, and also an equation showing the evolution of public debt. For a discussion of 
how variables are defined see, again, Appendix A. The model presented here is analysed in more 
detail in Stehn (2006).  
 
The first equation is, as before, a dynamic IS curve:  
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where, as above,  t %  is a demand shock. As in equation (1), monetary policy sets the interest rate, 
which affects output with a lag. “Fiscal policy” will be taken to mean changes in government 
expenditure,   , not changes in tax rates. t g
 16 If individuals have finite lives, then both government 
spending and the level of government debt will matter in the IS curve. (See Blanchard, 1985,  and 
Yaari, 1965.) We can see that an increase in government spending,  , then has two effects. 
Firstly, it raises output directly via aggregate demand, with multiplier %, which we set at 1.1. 
Secondly, this expenditure will lead it to issue extra public debt and – with Blanchard-Yaari 
consumers - a fraction of this will be treated as net wealth. As a result consumption, and thus 
output, will rise further, by an amount denoted by the parameter &, which we set at 0.01, for 
reasons discussed in Appendix A. In order to avoid giving fiscal policy a “stealth advantage” in 
our investigations, we will assume that fiscal spending decisions need to be taken one period in 
advance of their actual implementation. We will therefore have a one-period “implementation 
lag” in the operation of fiscal policy, and a one-period “effect lag”, as described above, in the 
operation of monetary policy. 
g
 
The second equation is, as before, a standard accelerationist Phillips curve: 
                                                   
16  We could treat the tax rate, ", as the fiscal instrument,  instead of spending. We study spending because we 
want to study the effect of fiscal policy on demand. If the tax rate was the instrucment then this would have a direct 
influence on inflation that would complicate the analysis. We discuss this alternative approach in Section 5.     
  10 
1 1 t t t y t & & ' " " # $ $(                     (6) 
 
Notice that in our Five Equation Model (i) both fiscal policy and monetary policy affect the IS 
curve, and (ii) neither policy influences inflation, other than through an indirect effect via output. 
This means that, in the control of inflation and output, the two instruments are perfect substitutes. 
That feature will be important in what follows. 
 
We also need an equation which describes the accumulation of public debt. For simplicity we log-
linearise the debt equation around the steady states of debt, b0, set at 0.6, and the equilibrium 
interest rate,  , which we set at 0.011.  0 r
17 The real stock of debt at the beginning of this period 
( ) depends on the stock of debt at the beginning of last period,  t b 1 t b " , plus the flows that occur 
between t-1 and t, in the following way: 
 
* + 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 t t t t t b r b r b g y t 2 3 " " " " # $ $ $ " $               (7) 
 
where 't is a debt shock.  
 
The relevant flows consist of real interest payments, government spending and revenues. Tax 
revenues are assumed to vary with output, in a way which gives rise to ‘automatic stabilisers’, at a 
constant tax rate ". Notice that we would return to the Three Equation Model if and only if  (i) 
government expenditure was exogenous, so that we could include any changes in government 
spending in the (exogenous) demand shock,  t % , and (ii) we could impose Ricardian Equivalence, 
by setting &=0, and (iii) there were no other effects of debt accumulation. That last requirement 
would  effectively  mean  that  endogenous  accumulation  of  debt  did  not  induce  changes  in 
government expenditure or the interest rate, so as, for example, to avoid fiscal insolvency.   
 
The  Five  Equation  Model  is  completed  by  adding  two  equations  showing  the  behaviour  of 
monetary policy and fiscal policy to the three equations (5), (6) and (7).  
 
3.2   Simple Policy Rules 
 
How can we achieve satisfactory policy when fiscal policy and monetary policy follow simple 
rules, like the Taylor rule for monetary policy which we described in Section 2? 
 
A Satisfactory Fiscal Rule when the Monetary Authorities follow a Taylor Rule  
 
In  Section  2,  we  learned  that  a  satisfactory  monetary  policy  for  our  simple  model  could  be 
specified in the form of a Taylor rule, and that an optimal monetary policy for this model would 
also take the form of a Taylor rule, with particular (optimised) coefficients. Suppose the monetary 
                                                   
17  See Appendix A. Note that since the model is quarterly, this corresponds to an annual real interest rate of  
just over four percent.  
  11authorities followed such a Taylor rule.
18 What would a fiscal policy rule need to look like, in 
these circumstances, in order to be satisfactory?  
 
Let us assume that the fiscal authorities choose a simple rule of (8) form.  
 
1 t t g y b 1 t 0 4 " # " " "                     (8) 
 
In this simple setup, fiscal policy feeds back on the level of debt and also helps the monetary 
authority to stabilise output, leaving the monetary authority to stabilise inflation.  
 
After substituting in these two policy rules we will have a fully complete Five Equation Model. 
For simplicity we take  & )  and  y )  to have the optimal values discussed in Section 2.  We can then 
investigate the behaviour of the system for different values and  0 and 4.  The result of this 
stability analysis is summarised in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: Stability and Cyclicality Boundaries for Fiscal Policy 
 
                                                   
18  An attentive reader might think that the class of Taylor rules could no longer contain the optimal rule. “This 
is because,” that reader might claim (using the argument of Chow (1975) which we appealed to in section 2.3)  “with 
the lagged value of debt now appearing as an additional state variable, the system is now third order: thus any optimal 
monetary rule must be third order, feeding back on debt as well as inflation and output.” But we will see below that the 
optimal coefficient, with which monetary policy should feed back on debt, is very close to zero. So the Taylor rule 
derived above in our analysis of the Three Equation system is a good approximation to the optimal policy rule for the 
model being analysed here. 
  12To ensure stability, the economy must be above the solid line, which traces out the stability 
boundary for the fiscal rule. Below this line, the feedback coefficient on debt is too small, so that 
debt interest payments will cumulate without bound, leading to system instability.   
 
The dashed line is a cyclicality boundary for the fiscal rule; it shows that cycles will result if µ is 
above this line. To understand how these cycles can arise, suppose for simplicity that 0 = 0, and 
consider a positive inflation shock at time t=0. This will raise the interest rate (via the Taylor 
rule). That causes output to fall at t=1 and so inflation will fall at t=2, as in the Three Equation 
system. But the interest rate increase will also cause debt to increase, at t=1, and the output fall 
will reduce tax revenues and make debt increase even more, at t=2. Because fiscal policy feeds 
back on this rising debt, there will be fiscal contraction and that will causes further falls in output 
at t=2 and t=3, and subsequently, and so inflation will go on falling at t=3 and t=4, and beyond 
then. If this feedback on debt is too strong, that will make inflation more likely to overshoot than 
it was in the Three Equation Model, and the economy will be more likely to exhibit cycles
19. As 
we discussed above for the Three Equation Model, such cycles are likely to be welfare-reducing, 
since an adjustment to equilibrium, which avoided such cycles, would probably lead to smaller 
divergences of inflation and output from their target levels.
20 It is obvious that this tendency 
towards cycles is enhanced if there is also substantial fiscal feedback on output – that is why the 
dotted  line  in  Figure  3  slopes  downward.  Even  although,  in  that  case,  fiscal  policy  tries  to 
moderate the effects on output of monetary control of inflation, it does so in such a way as to 
induce cumulative movements in debt which, if there is strong feedback on debt, will cause a 
cyclical outcome.  
 
Figure  4  plots  impulse  responses  to  a  unit  inflation  shock  for  two  sets  of  fiscal  feedback 
coefficients. The solid line plots the dynamic response of the economy is there is a small feedback 
on debt (4 = 0.03), and if there is no fiscal feedback on output (0 =0). These parameters ensure 
stability  but  do  not  lead  to  cycles.  The  dashed  line  corresponds  to  the  case  of  larger  fiscal 
feedback (4 = 0. 15) but still with no feedback on output; we can see that both output and inflation 
overshoot in this case. We could also illustrate the case with this larger fiscal feedback on debt 
and also with a large response to output (say with 0 = 0.4). As we might expect from Figure 3, a 
system with such a fiscal rule cycles even more severely. 
 
                                                   
19  We can put this point more formally as follows. Consider a Three Equation Taylor rule system with values of 
the Taylor rule coefficients such that it is “satisfactory”, i.e. such that it does not cycle. Now add equations (7) and (8) 
to that system. Then, in general, a sufficiently large µ can be found such that the five-equation system will have two 
complex eigenvalues, and so will be cyclical.  
20  The reason for these cycles in the present model is the persistence of inflation. Note, however, that even for 
entirely forward looking models, welfare is maximised for small fiscal feedback, see Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis 
(2005).  
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses to Inflation Shock 
 
This analysis suggests that if we know that monetary policy stabilises the economy well, then a 
good fiscal policy should feed back on debt with a small coefficient, and with a small response to 
output, if any. This lack of response to output is sensible because output is well controlled by 
monetary policy alone. We will show, later in Section 4 , that a fiscal policy very like this is not 
only satisfactory, but also optimal. 
 
Optimal Monetary Policy in Face of a Simple Fiscal Policy Rule  
 
Let us describe what optimal monetary policy looks like when fiscal policy is constrained to 
follow a simple feedback on the level of debt, in the manner suggested in the previous paragraph:  
 
1 t g t b 4 " # "                        (8’) 
 
Notice that, in this case, the automatic stabilisers mean that debt accumulation will also depend 
negatively on the level of output, as shown in equation (7).   
 
Now we substitute the fiscal rule (8’) into the system and solve for optimal monetary policy, 
which minimises the social loss function, L, given in equation (4). We use the same value for   
that we used above,  =0.5. Subject to this constraint, optimal monetary policy will take the form 
of a rule in which there is a feedback on the three lagged state variables, #t-1, yt-1, and bt-1  of the 
system 
21. These optimal feedback coefficients can be written as  & ) ,  y )   b ) and are plotted in 
Figure 5 as a function of the strength of fiscal feedback, µ.  
 
                                                   
21  See again Chow (1975) 
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Figure 5: Feedback Coefficients for Monetary Policy Rule 
 
We can notice two things from Figure 5.  
 
First, it is clear that as soon as the fiscal feedback on debt, µ , is high enough, the optimal 
monetary policy will be “conventional”
 22. That is, it will feed back on inflation and output, with 
coefficients which satisfy Taylor principle. For obvious reasons, Leeper (1991) used the word 
“active” to describe this system. 
 
Second, we can see from the final panel of the figure that, when fiscal feedback on debt is small – 
i.e. with a coefficient just above the interest rate - then the optimal monetary feedback on debt 
will be negligibly different from zero and the optimal monetary policy rule in this Five Equation 
Model can be described by a Taylor rule with only two coefficients. These coefficients  & ) and  y )  
are almost exactly equal to the coefficients which we found in Section 2, in the Three Equation 
system in which debt was ignored. 
 
We can also see that, as the fiscal feedback on debt is tightened, i.e. as µ is increased, the optimal 
monetary feedback on debt will be made negative, but the values of  & ) and  y )  will be essentially 
unchanged.  The  reason  for  this  is  the  following.  The  inflation  shock  raises  debt  (  because 
monetary policy raises the interest rate), and if  µ is large this would lead to a substantial decline 
in government spending, which would  deflate the economy.  So fiscal policy essentially helps 
stabilise the economy against an inflation shock. This means that there would be less of a need for 
real interest rates to rise in order to stabilise inflation.  But this form of fiscal policy is less 
efficient at the stabilisation of demand than monetary policy: our calculations of L – not reported 
here - show that overall welfare is maximised if the fiscal feedback on debt 4 is very small, i.e. 
with a coefficient just above the interest rate. 
  
The “Fiscal Theory of the Price Level” in this Setup 
 
                                                   
22  Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000) show that this change in regime happens when 4 is just above the interest rate. 
  15Traditionally it was thought that some minimum level of fiscal feedback on debt was required for 
the economy to be stable. That is, it was thought that µ needed to be large enough to stabilize 
debt, in the way that we have assumed up until now. However, this view was challenged, most 
noticeably by Leeper (1991), who put forward what has become known as the “Fiscal Theory of 
the  Price  Level”.  This  argued  that  a  stable  equilibrium  may  be  possible  without  such  fiscal 
feedback,  if  monetary  policy  becomes  driven  by  the  need  to  ensure  the  fulfilment  of  the 




Figure  5  shows  the  nature  of  optimal  monetary  policy  when  µ  is  very  small,  so  that  fiscal 
feedback is not large enough to stabilise debt. In this case optimal monetary policy will lower the 
interest rate in response to an inflation shock. This regime was called “passive” by Leeper (1991), 
who was the first to discuss this kind of outcome. What we see is a monetary policy that does not 
satisfy Taylor principle, and so does not succeed in stabilising inflation around its target. Instead 
this “passive” monetary policy is devoted to ensuring that debt does not explode, which – given 
the appearance of debt in the IS curve – would cause the economy to explode. By behaving in a 
passive way – and not controlling inflation – monetary authority is able to ensure the solvency of 
the fiscal authority.
24 That is to say, in these circumstances, the optimising monetary authority 
will choose to abandon the control of inflation, and go instead for the control of debt.
25  
 
This discussion suggests that fiscal feedback on debt is important, and that its absence can force 
monetary authorities to take over the task of debt stabilisation, to ensure macroeconomic stability, 
at the expense of inflation control. McCallum and Nelson (2005) discuss this issue in detail. The 
results of our calculations of L – not reported here - show that such a “passive regime” has 
severely negative welfare consequences
26. We do not discuss it further. 
 
3.3  Interim Summary 
 
We have learned a considerable amount from this investigation of simple rules.  
 
(a)  If monetary policy follows an active stabilisation policy (i.e. follows a Taylor rule) then a 
satisfactory fiscal policy will require a feedback on debt as in (8’) (i) with a positive parameter 4 
which is (ii) above the interest rate but small. And vice versa: we have also learned that if the 
                                                   
23  Some readers may be surprised at a discussion of the “fiscal theory of the price level” in the context of an 
entirely backward-looking model. But Leith et.al. (2003) show that it is not crucial that prices be able to jump so as to 
deflate nominal debt – they, too, discuss how this issue can be thought of in an entirely backward-looking setting.   
24  Figure 5 shows that in this case fiscal policy will also feed back on output, but with a lower coefficient than 
before. This feedback means that, as tax receipts fall with falling output, the interest rate is lowered, so as to reduce 
interest payments. 
25  It does so because doing this causes a sustained inflationary loss, which is finite in each period, but doing the 
opposite would (as we have seen) cause the economy to explode, and that would lead to loss which tended towards 
infinity in each period. 
26  See Kirsanova and Wren Lewis (2005). That paper discusses the above issue in a microfounded model with 
forward-looking elements, which also allows a welfare analysis. 
  16fiscal feedback on debt 4 is above some threshold but small, then a satisfactory outcome will 
require an “active” monetary policy.  
 
 (b)  Also, to a first-order approximation, we can say that, in this setup (i) the optimal monetary 
policy will be exactly the same as the optimal Taylor rule obtained in Section 2, and (ii) the 
optimal fiscal feedback on debt will have a parameter just above the interest rate.  
 
But there is more to learn. 
 
4    OPTIMISING FISCAL-AND-MONETARY-POLICY GAMES 
 
We now investigate what happens if both monetary policy makers, and fiscal policy makers, 
derive policy in an optimising manner. Once we do this, game theoretic issues emerge, such as the 
type of interaction between the policy-makers, and the timing of this interaction. 
 
If we are to discuss optimising fiscal policy, then the social welfare function will need to be 
extended. Let us assume that agents derive utility from the provision of public goods purchased 
by government spending. In our simple linearised model we can let   denote the deviation of 
public spending from its desired level. We include in the social welfare function a penalty for 
non-zero  values  of  .  If  policymakers  are  benevolent,  then  this  penalty  should  enter  their 




We write the loss function, Li, for the monetary authority (i = m) and for the fiscal authority (i = f) 
as follows: 
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where   i and (j  describe the weights placed on output variability (relative to the policymaker’s 
target level of output), and on public spending variability, by each of the policymakers, relative to 
inflation variability.  
 
Note that the level of debt does not enter the loss function. The reason for this is intuitively clear 
from the stability analysis of our model which we presented in the previous section. We have 
learned that if the fiscal policy feeds back on debt with a large coefficient, then that is likely to be 
welfare-reducing.  This  is  because  the  economy  will  exhibit  cycles,  and  so  the  volatility  of 
inflation and output, which are important for household welfare, will be higher
27. But if the policy 
authorities had debt target in their objectives, then a policymaker would have to feed back on debt 
with a coefficient, proportional to the size of the penalty on debt in the objective function. That 
 
27  These cycles could be removed if fiscal policy simultaneously fed back on inflation with a large coefficient. 
But in this case, there would be too much output sacrifice, following an inflation shock, and that would worsen the 
outcome for a policymaker with a positive value for - in loss function (9). 
  17would compromise the stability of key macroeconomic variables
28 and lead to a loss of household 
welfare. We thus do not include debt in the social loss function. There may be separate political-
economy reasons for stabilising debt, but we abstract from them in this paper. 
29 
 
We will compare three different regimes, which result from three different forms of interaction 
between the policy authorities, in the face of shocks.  
 
 (i)  First, we take as a benchmark case the outcome which occurs if the fiscal and monetary 
policy-makers cooperate with each other in pursuit of a common objective, which is also the 
objective of the household sector.  
 
 (ii)  Second, we study the equilibrium which emerges when the fiscal authority moves first, as 
a Stackelberg leader, anticipating the response from the monetary authority. This is what we 
believe happens in the UK. In the light of our discussion in Section 2.4, we assume that the 
monetary policymaker is benevolent. We will examine what happens in this regime when the 
fiscal authority is benevolent like the monetary authority, and we also examine what happens 
when the fiscal authority is not benevolent. 
 
 (iii)  Third, we study the equilibrium when monetary and fiscal policy set their instruments 
simultaneously in a Nash game. This is what might happen within EMU. We again assume that 
the monetary authority is benevolent. We examine what happens in this setup when the fiscal 
authority is benevolent, and when it is not. 
 
4.1  Benchmark Regime: Cooperation between Benevolent Policymakers  
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Such a policymaker does not aim for excess output (i.e. y =0), and she discounts the future at a 
rate !,  which is the social rate of discount,  assumed to be !=0.99. The weights - and 5 are 
supposed  to  reflect  household  preferences  (see  Woodford  2003).  This  is  why  we  call  such 
policymaker benevolent. 
 
The outcome with cooperation between benevolent policymakers is displayed in Figure 6a. For a 
discussion of how all of the results displayed in Figures 6a to 6c are computed see Appendix B.  
 
The  optimal  policy  is  almost  exactly  the  same  as  that  which  was  obtained  in  Section  3  for 
monetary policy, in the case in which the fiscal authority was feeding back very weakly on debt. 
This means that the optimal monetary rule, which emerges from the coordinated game with the 
                                                   
28  Unless there was signficant fiscal feedback on inflation. But that – as explained in the previous footnote - is 
undesirable. 
29  See Stehn (2006) for an analysis of a setup in which  debt is included in the objective function. 
  18fiscal authority, is a conventional Taylor rule, and the optimal values of  & )  and y )  are very nearly 
the same as those shown used to produce Figure 1. The optimal fiscal policy is to feed back onto 
debt in a way to make it only slightly more stable than a random walk, i.e. to feed back with a 
very small coefficient. That is, the optimal value of µ is just above the interest rate, and the 
optimal value for 0 is very nearly zero. There is also a small fiscal feedback on inflation. .  
 
This means that the stabilisation of the economy is essentially carried out by monetary policy. The 
reason is partly due to the perfect substitutability between fiscal policy and monetary policy in the 
control of output and inflation (i.e. the fact that fiscal policy enters the IS curve in exactly the 
same way as monetary policy, and neither policy enters the Phillips curve). Consider the case of 
an inflation shock. After such a shock, anything that fiscal policy can do to reduce inflation, 
monetary policy can do, for exactly the same cost in terms of lost output. But changes in fiscal 
policy have been assumed to be costly (with penalty (), whereas changes in monetary policy have 
been assumed not to be costly. Thus - obviously - the task of stabilisation should be carried out by 
monetary policy, since “anything that fiscal policy can do, monetary policy can do in a way which 
is cheaper”. This is why fiscal policy optimally feeds back on inflation and debt with very small 
coefficients. Of course, debt has to be stabilised, even although debt is not directly in the social 
welfare function. That is because variability of debt disturbs output, via the consumption function. 
Since monetary policy can influence debt accumulation, one might have thought that it should 
deviate  from  stabilising  inflation-and-output  in  order  to  help  stabilise  debt,  especially  since 
monetary  and  fiscal  instruments  are  not  perfect  in  stabilising  debt.  But  this  task  of  debt 
stabilisation would cause the monetary policy to be passive, i.e. to give up efforts to stabilise 
inflation and output. That would be welfare-reducing. (See Section 3.2 for the relevant intuition.) 
So the monetary policy-maker will only react to debt with a negligible coefficient and very nearly 
all of the stablisation of debt is done by fiscal policy. And, since fiscal stabilisation of debt is 
costly, the fiscal authority finds it optimal to exploit debt accumulation more-or-less up to the 
limit, and keeps the level of debt only just stationary.  
  19   
Figure 6a: Cooperation between Benevolent Authorities 
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Figure 6b: The Fiscal Authority Discounts the Future 
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  224.2  A Nash Game between the Fiscal and Monetary Policy-Makers 
 
It  is  helpful  to  study  next  the  equilibrium  which  emerges  when  the  monetary  and  fiscal 
policymakers set their instruments simultaneously, in a Nash game. In the light of our discussion 
in  Section  2.4,  we  assume  that  the  monetary  policymaker  is  benevolent.  We  examine  what 
happens in this setup when the fiscal authority is benevolent like the monetary policymaker. But 
we also examine what happens if, for political reasons, the fiscal policymaker is not benevolent. 
That is, we examine what happens if the fiscal authority either discounts the future or aims for 
excess output. 
 
(a)  Benevolent Fiscal Policy Makers  
 
The result is obviously the same as in the Benchmark Case. This is simply because when the 
players have identical objectives – as they would in this case – there can be no externalities 
between them. Consider a particular example of an inflation shock. In the cooperative solution, 
the monetary and fiscal authorities choose their efforts such that the marginal gain in inflation and 
output  variability  is  equal  to  the  marginal  loss  from  the  volatility  of  the  fiscal  instrument.  
Suppose now that the fiscal authorities were to attempt to play a more active part in stabilising an 
inflation shock than they do in the cooperative regime, so they decide to have an additional fiscal 
contraction. This will improve the inflation outcome, but at expense of the higher variability of 
the fiscal instrument. As their total loss will rise, the total cost of monetary authorities will rise 
too. The monetary authorities will have to step in and expand, in order to offset the effects of 
unwanted fiscal contraction on inflation and output, thus making sure that the fiscal authorities 
cannot achieve anything by contraction and so preventing them from undertaking such efforts. By 
a similar process of reasoning, any hypothetical outcome different from that presented in Section 
4.1 can be shown to be suboptimal. When the objectives are the same, the cooperative and the 
Nash outcomes coincide.  
 
 (b)  The Fiscal Policymaker Discounts the Future 
 
Suppose  that  the  fiscal  authority  has  a  shorter  planning  horizon  than  the  monetary  authority 
( F M , , 6 ), that is, suppose that she is impatient and so would choose to postpone losses to the 
future rather than accept them now. We assume that  M ,  remains at 0.99, but that  F ,  falls to 
0.98, which is a very small reduction. 
 
In the face of an inflation shock, the impatient fiscal authority will now have a desire to delay the 
required recession, and will attempt to do so when playing a Nash game. But the patient monetary 
authority  will  react,  by  raising  the  interest  rate,  so  as  to  continue  to  fight  inflation.  As  we 
discussed above in Section 4.1, the monetary authorities could completely offset any effect that 
the fiscal policy has on inflation and output. This desire to offset the fiscal effects on demand and 
  23inflation will lead the monetary policy to a decision to raise the interest rate so as to very nearly 
exactly offset the intervention caused by the fiscal authority.  
 
The outcome is the one shown in Figure 6b with a solid line. We there show that the monetary 
authorities offset the fiscal effect on output and inflation, but at the expense of higher interest 
rates. Because inflation is controlled via demand, every effort to increase demand by the fiscal 
authority will be offset by the monetary authority – all that the fiscal authority gets from higher 
government spending is higher interest rates.  As a result inflation and output will be almost 
exactly the same as in the cooperative regime of benevolent policymakers. This outcome clearly 
yields lower welfare than what would happen in that cooperative case, because it leads to a higher, 
possibly a much higher, variance for government spending. 
 
This outcome results in a higher accumulation of debt. Notice that this happens even although the 
degree of  impatience of the fiscal authority is only trivially greater than that of the monetary 
authority i.e. even although the value of ! is only trivially lower for the fiscal authority than for 
the monetary aughoritiy. We have shown that, if we were to further increase the impatience of the 
fiscal  authorities,  debt  accumulation  becomes  an  explosive  process.  This  is  because  the  debt 
accumulation  process  is  already  a  near  random  walk  process  in  the  cooperative  regime  of 
benevolent policymakers. Thus it does not require very large increases in government spending, 
or vary large increases in interest rates, in order to reach a threshold, beyond which debt becomes 
explosive. That is why the plots for government expenditure, and for the interest rate, are not very 




This is a significant result. It shows how vulnerable the economy can be to even small differences 
of objectives, when the fiscal and monetary authorities play Nash against each other. This is 
because the perfect substitution of the two instruments in their effect on demand and thus, the 
ability of one authority to offset the effects of the other, will in effect lead to an unstable civil war 
between them. In this war, each authority will  indeed offset each other’s actions, but with a 
possibly catastrophic effect on debt.
31  
 
We can extend this analysis to a discussion of the case to the situation in which the fiscal authority 
has a lower relative weight on inflation than the monetary authority. In that case, in the Nash 
regime, the fiscal authority will attempt to counteract the contraction caused by the monetary 
authority, in the face of an inflation shock. In fact the outcome is identical to what happens when 
the fiscal authority discounts more heavily than the monetary authority. This is because caring 
relatively more about output is equivalent to discounting: a policymaker who cares more about 
output will delay any necessary reduction in output in exactly the same way as would be done by 
                                                   
30  If the level of debt appeared in the authorities’ loss function then that would decrease the sensitivity of the 
equilibrium to the discount factor: the threshold for ,  below which debt became explosive would be lower. But this 
would result in a higher fiscal feedback on debt, and in a higher volatility of inflation and output, than was optimal. If 
the debt target does not reflect household preferences, as it is likely to be the case, then the policymakers are not 
benevolent anymore, and a minimisation of their costs would not necessarily minimise household welfare. 
31  Of course this “perfect substitutability” property is an oversimplification. We discuss the possible structure of 
a more general model below in Section 5, when we discuss the model by Dixit and Lambertini (2003).  
  24an impatient policy-maker.
32 Notice that the point being discussed here is not in an argument in 
favour of a conservative central banker. It is, instead, an argument that a fiscal authority will 
cause damage if she is inadequately conservative, if she plays Nash with a benevolent central 
bank.  
 
(c)     Fiscal Policymaker has an Excessive Output Target 
 
Suppose  instead  that  the  fiscal  authorities  face  the  incentive  to  target  output  above  potential 
( 0 y 7 ). 
 
The outcome in the Nash regime is now much worse than it was in the previous case. Here higher 
government spending and higher interest rates are long-lasting. The fiscal authority expands to 
achieve its excessive target, whilst the central bank contracts to eliminate the consequent inflation. 
As  a  result,  debt  becomes  a  unit  root  process  for  any  0 y 7 ,  see  Figure  6c,  solid  line.  The 
cooperative regime is plotted there with a dotted line. 
 
4.3  Fiscal Policymaker is a Stackelberg Leader  
 
We  now  study  the  equilibrium  which  emerges  when  the  fiscal  authority  moves  first,  as  a 
Stackelberg leader, anticipating the response from the monetary authority. In the light of our 
discussion  in  Section  2.4,  we  assume  that  the  monetary  policymaker  is  benevolent.  We  first 
examine what happens in this setup when the fiscal authority is benevolent too. But we also 
examine what happens in this setup when, for political reasons, the fiscal policymaker is not 
benevolent.  
 
(a)  Benevolent Fiscal Policymaker  
 
Again the result is obviously the same as in the Benchmark Case. This is again because the game 
is one in which both policymakers are aiming for the same objective. Any hypothetical outcome 
different  from  that  presented  in  Section  4.1  can  be  shown  to  be  suboptimal  to  the  fiscal 
policymaker, by a similar process of reasoning to that used in Section 4.2., and so we converge on 
the outcome discussed in Section 4.1. 
 
(b)  Fiscal Policymaker Discounts the Future 
 
Suppose that the fiscal authority has a shorter planning horizon than the monetary authority so 
that  F M , , 6 . In the face of an inflation shock, an impatient fiscal authority would have a desire 
to delay the required recession. But a fiscal authority who is also a Stackelberg leader will also 
know  that  the  patient  monetary  authority,  who  is  a  Stackelberg  follower,  will  react  so  as  to 
                                                   
32  Henry et al (2006) show that there is an exact equivalence result between the effects of a higher degree of 
discounting and an increased preference for output. 
  25overturn  the  effects  of  such  a  fiscal  action,  in  order  to  fight  inflation  in  its  (supposedly) 
benevolent manner. This means that the effects of the expansionary fiscal intervention on inflation 
and output would be overturned, in a similar way to what happens in the Nash regime (which we 
described above). But now, acting as a Stackelberg leader, the fiscal authority would know that 
this would happen. Therefore, there would be nothing to gain as a result of doing this. Since 
acting in this way, for no perceived benefit, would be costly, the fiscal authority would not do it.
33 
This is also shown in Figure 6b with a dash-dotted line.  
 
We can of course extend this case to the situation in which the fiscal authority has a lower relative 
weight  on  inflation  than  the  monetary  authority.  Then,  even  although  the  fiscal  policymaker 
would like to dampen the contraction caused by the monetary authority, in the face of an inflation 
shock, she will in fact not act in this way. This is because, just as in the discussion presented in 
the previous paragraph, she knows that any desirable (to her) effects which this (costly) action 
would have would be countermanded by the benevolent monetary authority.  
 
(c)  Fiscal Policymaker has an Excessive Output Target 
 
Instead  suppose  that  the  fiscal  authorities  face  the  incentive  to  target  output  above  potential 
( 0 y 7 ). 
 
Here  again  the  outcome  in  the  Stackelberg  regime  is  almost  as  good  as  in  the  benchmark 
cooperative case. The fiscal policymaker would like to set a high level of government spending 
and get a high level of output. But she knows that she will not, in these circumstances, get a high 
level of output, but just high interest rates. So the fiscal policymaker will not do this. This is 
shown in Figure 6c, by a dash-dotted line. 
 
4.4  Fiscal Regimes: Gordon Brown versus EMU  
 
These results show what is required for a good fiscal policy, if the world is adequately  described 
by our model. We can summarise our findings as follows. 
(a)   If the regime is one in which the fiscal authority is able to act as a Stackelberg leader then 
her preferences are relatively unimportant. Good monetary policy will ensure good outcomes.  
(b)  If the regime is instead one in which the fiscal authority plays Nash then her preferences 
can be vitally important. If the preferences of the fiscal authority are such that she does any of: 
discounting the future, overvaluing output, or aiming for excess output, then the outcomes can be 
very bad indeed. Current institutional structures in OECD countries  – with fiscal policy in the 
hands of regularly elected politicians – makes it both possible and likely that fiscal preferences 
will have some or all of these features.  
 
                                                   
33  There is a minimal threshold for  F , , below which the debt explodes. But this threshold is much lower than 
under Nash. 
  26In a single country setting, like the UK, it is reasonable to argue that the fiscal authority is able to 
act as the Stackelberg leader. We therefore expect the social costs of a fiscal policymaker that 
targets excess output and/or discounts strongly to be small: “the Treasury will be tamed by the 
Bank of England”. Note that such support for the UK policy framework framework does not 
depend on the oft-stated view that in the UK fiscal policy is “not really active” in the control of 
the economy, and that the UK Treasury deliberately constrains its policy, in a way which prevents 
it from helping the monetary authority to stabilise the economy, in a way which it might choose to 
do, if it were not so constrained. We have shown, instead, that the fiscal authority, if it is able to 
act  as  a  Stackelberg  leader,  will  choose  to  let  the  monetary  authority  do  nearly  all  of  the 
macroeconomic stabilisation of the economy, and that it will choose to do this even if it (i) over-
discounts the future and (ii) would like to see output at an excessive level. Our support for Gordon 
Brown’s strategy comes not from the UK’s fiscal rules. It comes from the fact that, in the UK, the 
fiscal authority is able to play the role of Stackelberg leader.  
 
Within EMU, by contrast, there is one central bank but many fiscal authorities. Clearly, these 
fiscal  authorities  cannot  act  as  a  Stackelberg  leader  unless  they  can  co-ordinate  amongst 
themselves. But that is obviously impossible within EMU: even a much less ambitious attempt to 
simply restrain deficits, in the form of the Stability and Growth Pact, was ineffective. EMU is thus 
forced to an outcome in which there cannot be Stackelberg leadership by the fiscal authorities. 
Our results suggest that there will be social welfare costs, possibly very large ones, whenever, 
within Europe, national fiscal policy interests differ from those of the ECB. The fact that fiscal 
decisions are in the hands of elected politicians suggests that these differences of interest exist, 
and that they may be large. This thus suggests that fiscal and monetary interactions within Europe 
may lead to low quality outcomes.  
Note that the argument of the previous two paragraphs has significant institutional implications. It 
means that within EMU there may be a need for Fiscal Policy Councils, to prevent the bad effects 
of having fiscal authorities with distorted objectives. But, by contrast, this may not be true for the 
UK. In the UK Stackelberg leadership by the fiscal authority may, on its own, be enough to 
prevent such bad outcomes from emerging, even if the fiscal authorities are not benevolent.    
 
Note that the argument in this paper about fiscal difficulties within EMU is based on the difficulty 
of stabilising shocks which are symmetric across Europe. It is quite different from the normal 
argument  about  problems  within  EMU,  which  is  based  on  the  difficulty  of  dealing  with 
asymmetric shocks which occur separately in different countries. (See Allsopp and Vines, 1998.) 
 
5  COMPARISON WITH OTHER RECENT WORK 
 
We now compare our findings with those of a paper by Dixit and Lambertini (2003). It is useful to 
compare our work with that paper in some detail because it has been widely cited, and influential. 
In this section we will also relate our work to an earlier paper by Blake and Weale (1998), and to 
recent papers by Adam and Billi (2005) and Hughes Hallet (2005).  
 
  275.1  Dixit and Lambertini (2000, 2003) 
 
The authors consider a stylised static model of a closed economy with two policymakers, in which 
output is suboptimally low, because of the monopoly power of firms, in the manner of Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977). The model can be summarised by means of two reduced form equations. There is 
an aggregate demand function, in which output depends on the fiscal instrument, on unexpected 
inflation (because, say, an unexpected increase in inflation lowers the real interest rate), and on 
shocks. There is also an equation for inflation, which depends on any fiscal intervention, on 
monetary policy, and shocks. Monetary policy controls the money supply: an increase in the 
money stock raises inflation directly. The fiscal instrument affects both aggregate demand and 
inflation. In any time period, outcomes depend on this model structure, on the expected rate of 
inflation, on shocks, and on policy preferences. The model is static. This means, in particular, that 
policies are unconstrained by the requirement to keep public debt under control. 
 
This paper is important from the methodological point of view. The model is well microfounded, 
and is suitable for analysing a range of policy scenarios. It is also a static model, and, as a result, 
the policy games played using it can be solved analytically, unlike in our paper.  
 
However the model is so general that it can generate a whole assortment of the rankings of the 
possible strategic equilibria. For example, the authors show that, using reasonable values for the 
model’s coefficients, Nash-equilibrium outcomes can be worse than those when there is fiscal 




In what follows, and in Appendix C, we show how, by restricting their setup, again in reasonable 
ways , we can get a much simpler version of their model which does not have these ambiguities. 
This stripped-down model also has the advantage that it is – in effect- a static simplification of our 
own model. Comparing the results which come from this Dixit-Lambertini-type model (DLT) 
enables us to make our own results much clearer. Our results have had to be obtained numerically, 
since they are so complex: they concern the dynamic outcomes of a intertemporally-optimsing 
policy-game, which is played in response to shocks. We will see that the DLT model produces 
static results, which can be derived analytically. These – we will show - are static simplifications 
of the dynamic numerical results obtained from our model. Doing all of this therefore helps us to 
underpin our own numerical results with analytical results. And it is especially useful since these 
analytical results come from a model derived from that in the Dixit and Lambertini paper, which 
is so well known. 
 
The model of Dixit and Lambertini is different from our own model in five ways.  
 
First,  the  authors’  work  is  driven  by  a  wish  to  analyse  the  problem  of  inflation  bias.    They 
consider how fiscal and monetary policies interact, not only in response to shocks, but also as a 
                                                   
34  There are some unambiguous conclusions in the paper, of course, but only concerning issues which are  
different from those which we are discussing here. 
  28result  of  the  fact  that  both  policies  are  driven  to  do  something  about  the  fact  that  output  is 
suboptimally low, as a result of the monopoly power of firms. Our paper does not study a setup 
like this, because we aim to study what we believe is current practice. We believe that it is 
appropriate to make an assumption of this kind for fiscal policymakers, who may well aim for 
excess output, above what the monopolistic economy has the capacity to sustain. But, as we 
explain in Section 3, we do not think that it is appropriate to assume this for monetary policy. 
Thus in our reformulation of the Dixit and Lambertini model we will also not assume this. All of 
our analysis in Section 4 concerns an economy in which inflation is only above target because of 
policy choices in response to shocks. Our reformulated Dixit andLambertini model will have this 
same property. 
 
Second,  in  the  published  version  of  the  paper  (Dixit  and  Lambertini,  2003)  the  fiscal  policy 
instrument is production subsidies. Higher subsidies counter the monopoly distortion and so raise 
output but they also lower prices directly; the overall effect on prices of increased subsidies is 
assumed to be negative, because the second effect is assumed to dominate the first. The results of 
the  published  version  of  the  paper  are  fundamentally  dependent  on  this  idea  that  a  fiscal 
expansion lowers the price level. Although this may be true in the short run, it cannot be true in 
the long run – since as we discuss in our paper, fiscal laxity leads to a continuing issue of public 
debt which will eventually lead to such large increase in expenditure as to increase the rate of 
inflation. It is impossible to accommodate both of these conflicting outcomes in a static model. 
One way out of that problem would be to locate the analysis in a dynamic model, like that in our 
paper.
35 Alternatively one could use government expenditure as the fiscal instrument, as in the 
authors do in their earlier working paper version of the paper (Dixit and Lambertini, 2000), and 
obtain a static model without this problem. We will recast their model  in this way – which has the 
added advantage of making their work more easily comparable with our own, which also uses 
government expenditures as the fiscal policy instrument.  
 
Third, the authors use the money supply rather then the interest rate as the policy instrument. This 
difference, which looks important, does not, in fact, matter at all. Their model contains a demand 
for money function which solves for the interest rate as a function of the money supply (and other 
things).  Thus  manipulation  of  the  money  supply  in  their  model  has  the  same  effect  as 
manipulating the interest rate in our model.   
 
Fourth, in their model the inflation process is forward-looking. In the version of their model 
which we construct, this feature turns out not to offer a real advantage. That is because our 
version of their model is linear, and shocks are additive, so that “certainly equivalence” applies. 
This means that, since inflation expectations are formed before shocks are revealed, and since the 
level-bias is removed by monetary policy (in the way which we have described above), expected 
                                                   
35  Weale et.al. (1989) study the problem examined here in a dynamic way, in a model in which a tax cut 
initially lowers inflation but also raises aggregate demand. In an accelerationist model of inflation, like that in this 
paper, this must eventually raise the rate of inflation. 




Fifth, and finally, their model is static. As a result, policies are unconstrained by the requirement 
to keep debt under control, so as to  ensure fiscal solvency. As will be obvious from Sections 3 
and 4 of this paper, we believe that this requirement necessarily imposes a dynamic structure on 
the  interactions  between  fiscal  and  monetary  policy,  and  that  this  dynamic  process  has  an 
important influence on the outcomes from these interactions.  One attempt to incorporate this 
feature in a static way in a linear version of the DLT model leads to the Hughes Hallett (2005) 
model,  which  we  discuss  later.  Modelling  these  processes  in  an  intertemporal,  dynamic  way 
would, in effect, turn the resulting model into our model.  
 
In Appendix C we represent the Dixit and Lambertini model by a setup, which we have called the 
DLT model, in which  (i) monetary policy has no level bias, (ii) government expenditure is used 
as the fiscal instrument, (iii) the monetary policy instrument is the real interest rate, (iv) the model 
is linear and shocks are additive, but (v) in which we stick to the authors’ decision not to analyse 
debt. We obtain a model with a static IS curve and a static, expectations-augmented, Phillips 
curve. We show in Appendix C that the DLT model gives a set of static results, analogous to our 
dynamic results.   
 
These findings from the DLT model correspond to an exact simplification of our dynamic results, 
providing that we also impose the assumption  on this model, which has been fundamental to our 
paper, that fiscal and monetary policy are perfect substitutes in the control of output and inflation. 
In the face of an inflation shock, cooperating benevolent authorities will cause a recession to 
emerge, and they will bring this about by monetary restraint, not fiscal restraint. The same will be 
true if the policy authorities play a game in which the fiscal authority is a Stackelberg leader, even 
if the fiscal authority has an excessive weight on output losses (which can be thought of as a static 
game equivalent to over-discounting the future, for reasons discussed in Section 4.) But if the 
fiscal and monetary authorities play a Nash game, then if the fiscal authority has an excessive 
weight  on  output  losses,  the  outcome  will  be  one  of  excessive  monetary  contraction,  and 
excessive  fiscal  expansion.  This  will  be  welfare  reducing.  Under  the  assumption  of  perfect 
substitutability between instruments, the DLT model, in which assumptions (i)—(v) hold, delivers 
exactly the kinds of results that we describe in our paper.  
 
We also show in Appendix C that the conflict between fiscal and monetary authorities, which 
occurs under Nash, and about which we have been so concerned in this paper, can be moderated if 
fiscal and monetary policy are not perfect substitutes in the control of inflation and output. In 
Section 4 of Appendix C  we show what happens if this moderation is very significant. It remains 
a real question as to whether it is significant.  We do not discuss that important question in this 
paper.  
                                                   
36  The original model of Dixit and Lambertini is non-linear, since coefficients are stochastic, and hence 
certainty equivalence does not apply (see Chow, 1975, pp 249, 290-291). Therefore expected inflation is not zero in 
their model.  
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5.2  Adam and Billi (2005) 
 
One way to make the model dynamic, in the way which Dixit and Lambertini do not do, is   
presented  by  Adam  and  Billi  (2005).  This  is  a  dynamic  two  period  model,    in  which  fiscal 
solvency is imposed. The purpose of their paper , again like that of Dixit and Lambertini and of 
our own paper, is to study how and why conflicts arise between fiscal and monetary authorities if 
they do not cooperate.  As in our model, fiscal policy sets public consumption (i.e. government 
spending). And as in our model, this government spending enters positively into the representative 
agent's utility function.  
 
Two important features of the paper should be noted. 
 
First, both fiscal and monetary policies deliberately target a level of output above its potential 
level. This potential level is inefficiently low, due to the same monopolistic distortions as those 
studied in the Dixit and Lambertini paper. The analysis in this paper is entirely devoted to this 
excess-output-target problem. Indeed the authors do not consider the response of the economy to 
shocks, which is the key purpose of our paper, and of the Dixit and Lambertini paper.  
 
Second, fiscal solvency is imposed by assuming that at all times, fiscal policy obeys a balanced-
budget constraint. Thus, there is no debt in the economy and government spending is financed by 
distortionary labour taxes.  
 
The two features, which we have just noted, drive many, if not all, of their outcomes. One of 
these, in particular, should be recorded. The fiscal authorities wish to increase output above its 
(suboptimally  low)  equilibrium  level.  That  will,  of  itself,  increase  the  rate  of  inflation.  But 
because of the balanced budget requirement, the fiscal authority can only do this by increasing the 
level of (distortionary) taxes, thus driving down further the equilibrium level of output, and so 
increasing the inflationary problems which they themselves cause by aiming at the (too high) 
undistorted level of output. The monetary authority understands this. It realises that, because the 
fiscal authority dislikes inflation, it (the monetary authority) can moderate excessive spending by 
the fiscal authority, by itself creating an excessive level of inflation, one above its own target. If it 
does this then, at the margin, the fiscal authority will set a lower level of government spending, 
and  will  thus  impose  a  smaller  increase  in  (distortionary)  taxes  on  the  economy.  This  result 
follows directly from a willingness to believe that, at the margin, the monetary authority will wish 
to tolerate excessive inflation as a way of getting higher output. In our model, we have ruled out a 
study of this issue, for reasons explained in Section 3. We believe that, in the absence of shocks, 
the monetary authority will aim for the non-inflationary level of output, even if that level is forced 
to  an  unduly  low  level  by  the  need  of  the  fiscal  authority  to  raise  the  taxes  to  support  its 
expenditure (see  Vickers  1998).    We  think  that  this  is  true  of  all  independent  central  banks, 
including both the Bank of England and of the ECB. 
 
  31This review does suggest to us, however, that there would be much gain from using the Adam and 
Billi two-period dynamic framework to study analytically – in a way which we have been unable 
to do - the problems of fiscal and monetary responses to shocks.  
 
5.3  Hughes Hallet (2005), and Blake and Weale (1998)  
 
One paper which it is important to mention is Hughes Hallett (2005). His model assumes, like 
ours, that inflation is controlled via output and that monetary and fiscal instruments are perfect 
substitutes in the control of output. Unlike Adam and Billi, he allows government spending to 
differ from tax revenues. As we discussed above, this model is essentially the DLT model, to 
which is added a static version of the budget constraint.  However, unlike in our paper, the author 
puts some penalty on debt in the objective function.  
 
That assumption has unwanted unwanted implications. The process of debt accumulation process 
is intrinsically dynamic. What, in the end, matters is enforcing the  intertemporal solvency of the 
government. A static model with a penalty on debt is not, we believe, a good way of doing this, 
especially since we have shown that the optimal way to control debt is slowly, in order to avoid 
cycles. This kind of analysis requires an explicitly dynamic model. 
 
Interestingly, in a much earlier paper, Blake and Weale (1998) consider a model which is much 
more like ours, and is similar to a dynamic version of the Hughes Hallett model. It has a static 
aggregate  demand  curve,  a  backward-looking  accelerationst    Phillips  Curve  and  a  debt 
accumulation equation. It is effectively our model with   = 0. The fiscal instrument is tax, and the 
monetary instrument is the real interest rate. They do not consider games which maximise welfare 
functions like those in our games, but instead they “allocate” the responsibilities of policy to 
separate policy authorities. Thus the monetary authority stabilises inflation (subject to a cost of 
moving interest rates), and the fiscal authority stabilises debt (subject to a cost of moving taxes). 
They consider two regimes: a Nash game, and a second regime in which the two authorities 
jointly minimise the sum of the two objectives. They find that Nash can lead to much higher 
inflation and debt and interest rates, and lower taxation. What they show, very effectively, is that 
outcomes for the key macroeconomic variables can be very bad under Nash. This paper is a first 
step towards our own. There is no concept of “benevolent policymaker”,or of social welfare, and 
their results can only be assessed using “common sense”. Nevertheless the paper makes very 
clearly the general point which emerges from our work. Outcomes  under Nash can be very bad, 
when the objectives of policymakers diverge.  
 
6  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we have studied the potential for fiscal policy to stabilise an economy, using a simple 
five equation model of a single economy. And we have shown how to use this model to study the 
interactions between fiscal policy and monetary policy. 
 
  32We  began  with  the  now  well-known  setting  of  Three  Equation  Taylor-rule  macroeconomics, 
which has been used to study the stabilisation of an economy by monetary policy alone. We used 
this setup to display what is meant by “good” monetary policy. In Section 3, we then extended 
this setup to a Five Equation system, and used that to describe what is meant by a “good” fiscal 
policy. While doing all this, we devoted much time to discussing the methodological issues of 
constructing good control policy in a dynamic economy.   
 
In Section 4 we used this Five Equation Model to display the outcomes of optimal monetary and 
fiscal policies, when they are used cooperatively to stabilise the economy against shocks. We also 
considered non-cooperative outcomes when the authorities play Nash game against each other, or 
when the fiscal authorities lead in a Stackelberg game. We assumed that the monetary authorities 
were benevolent. But we studied what happens if the fiscal authorities are not benevolent, because 
they might have different objectives from those of society as a whole.   We showed three things 
using numerical   simulations of these games.    
 
We first showed the outcome, if fiscal authorities and monetary authorities are benevolent, and 
cooperate with each other in the setting of their macroeconomic policy instruments. We show that, 
in this case, the response to an inflation shock will be one in which the fiscal authorities let 
monetary policy perform nearly all of the burden of stabilising the economy in the face of the 
shock. Debt will be controlled by fiscal policy, but only slowly. 
 
Second, we showed that exactly this same good outcome will occur if the fiscal authority is able 
to act as a Stackelberg leader, even if the fiscal authority discounts the future too much, and/or 
desires to aim for excess output. We think that this is possibly what happens in the UK. That is 
why we support  the current  fiscal policy framework for the UK.  
 
Third, we showed that if the fiscal authority plays against the monetary authority in a Nash game, 
then social welfare will be harmed, and possibly greatly harmed, if the fiscal authority discounts 
the future too much, and/or desires to aim for excess output. We think that this  might  happen 
within EMU. That is why we are very critical of the current institutional arrangements for fiscal 
and monetary policy within EMU. 
 
In the last part of the paper we spent much time showing how our model can be related to the rest 
of the existing literature on the interactions between fiscal policy and monetary policy. To date, 
most  of  that  literature  considers  static  games  played  between  the  fiscal  authorities  and  the 
monetary authorities (albeit repeated ones). We have therefore constructed a simple static model -  
the DLT model presented in Appendix C - which captures the key features of that static literature. 
In particular, this DLT model can be viewed as a simple stripped-down version of the model by 
Dixit and Lambertini (2003), which is widely-cited. We have used this DLT model to explain the 
key insights which come from the Dixit and Lambertini paper. We have also used it as a platform 
from which to view the other related papers. At the same time this DLT model is also a simple 
version of the dynamic model which we have analysed in the body of this paper.  We have thus 
  33also been able to use this model to get important analytical insight into the   numerical simulation 
results which we have presented in the main body of the paper.    
 
The results in this paper come from a model which is not explicitly micro-founded, and which 
agents are backward looking. We deliberately adopted such a model for expositional reasons. It 
would be possible to move to a model in which there are explicit microfoundations, in which 
agents are forward-looking, and in which there is a loss function derived from the underlying 
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  36APPENDIX A 
 
In deriving our system of equations we have assumed that the behavioural consumption function 
is    and  the  equation  for  aggregate  demand  is 
. 
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We substitute the consumption function into the equation for aggregate demand, and then log-
































, we obtain equation (5), and also equation (1) if government spending is 
ignored,  where  * +
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The equation for accumulation of the real stock of public debt can be written as: 
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Log-linearising this in a way similar to that used above, we obtain equation (8). 
 
We calibrate a1+ a2=0.7 to be equal to the labour share in GDP (we take a1=0.5), and we set 
a3=0.8 which is less than one. The tax rate is set to 30%. For Blanchard-Yaari consumers we set 
the probability of death of 0.01 (that corresponds to average working life of 25 years) and so we 
calibrate  a4  =  0.01.  The    steady  state  real  interest  rate  should  be  just  above  1/,  so  we  set 
R0=0.011. The steady state level of debt is taken as 60% of GDP. This calibration leads to the 




This appendix explains the solution method used to compute the pictures shown in Figures 6a, 6b, 
and 6c. 
 
Benevolent authorities and cooperation 
 
When the authorities are benevolent and cooperate, the constrained loss function is 
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where the constraints include equations (5), (6) and (7). 
  37 
In order to write the first-order-conditions (FOCs) , we need to differentiate this equation with 
respect to all of the instruments, g and r, and all state variables, &, y, b, 
y
t 8 ,  t
& 8 , and 
b
t 8 . We 
obtain the system of eight variables for eight unknowns, in which the state variables &, y and b are 
predetermined  variables,  and  in  which  all  instruments  and  Lagrange  multipliers  are  jump 
variables. Note that the FOCs with respect to the Lagrange multipliers produce equations (5), (6) 
and (7).  The system can be solved using the generalised Schur decomposition, as explained in 
Soderlind  (1999).
37  As  we  minimise  a  quadratic  loss  function  subject  to  linear  system  with 
additive shocks, our fully optimal solution is certainty equivalent, see Chow (1975). It means that 
the solution is the same as we would obtain if we replaced all stochastic variables (shocks in our 




When authorities play a Nash game, the monetary authorities’ constrained loss function is: 
* + * + *
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The first-order conditions for the monetary authority are seven equations which are obtained by 
differentiation of the   with respect to one instrument r, and all state variables, &, y, b, 
m L
my
t 8 , 
m
t
& 8 , and  
mb
t 8 .   
 
The fiscal authorities’ constrained loss function is  
* + * + *
* + * + * ++









t f t f t t t t t t t
t
b
t t t t t t t t t t t t
L y g y r b g
y r b r B g y
&
, & - 5 8   ! 0 1 %




" " " " " "
# $ $ $ " $ $ $
$ $ $ " $ $ $ $ " $ "





The first-order conditions for the fiscal authority can be obtained by differentiation of   with 
respect to the instrument g, and all state variables, &, y, b, 
f L
fy
t 8 , 
f
t
& 8 , and  
fb
t 8 . Note that, for both 
authorities, the FOCs with respect to Lagrange multipliers produce equations (5), (6) and (7).  
 
To obtain the Nash solution we need to solve the two of systems of equations simultaneously. We 
obtain a final system of eleven equations, in which are included all seven FOCs for the monetary 
authorities and all seven of the FOCs for the fiscal authorities with respect to g, &, y and b. But 
since, for both authorities, the FOCs with respect to the Lagrange multipliers produce the same 
equations – i.e. equations (5), (6) and (7) -  this gives eleven independent equations in eleven 
unknowns.  Again,  the  resulting  system  can  be  solved  using  the  with  generalised  Schur 
                                                   
37  This system has a singular left-hand side, so the method of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) is not suitable. 
  38decomposition, knowing that &, y and b are predetermined variables and that all other variables 
are jump variables. 
 
Stackelberg equilibrium with fiscal leadership 
 
The optimisation problem for the monetary authorities is the same as for the Nash equilibrium, 
and we obtain seven first order conditions. The leader’ however, takes into account the follower’s 
reaction  function,  whereas  the  follower’s  reaction  function  is  described  by  the  first  order 
conditions to the follower’s optimisation problem. Hence, the loss function for the fiscal leader is 
the following: 
* + * + *
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where in the last line of the formula above we include, as additional constraints, the first order 
conditions of the follower with respect to all variables except the Lagrange multipliers
38. We 
differentiate  this  constrained  loss  function  with  respect  to  both  instruments,  r  and  g,  all 
predetermined state variables &, y and b, and all Lagrange multipliers, 
f 8  and 
f 9 . We obtain 
eleven equations, three of which repeat the FOCs of the follower’s optimisation problem and not 
included in the final system. The final system consists of the first order conditions of the two 
players.  It  contains  all  seven  FOCs of  the  follower’s  optimisation  problem  and  eight  (out  of 
eleven)  FOCs  for  the  leader.  We  solve  this  system  again  using  the  generalised  Schur 
decomposition, knowing that &, y and b are predetermined variables, that the Lagrange multipliers 
f 9  are predetermined variables too




A STATIC DIXIT-LAMBERTINI-TYPE (DLT) MODEL 
 
C.1  Model  
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38  The first order conditions with respect to Lagrange multipliers produce equations (5), (6) and (7) which are 
already included as constraints. 
39  As are those attached to constraints on jump variables. Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle requires one to set 
initial conditions on predetermined Lagrange multipliers to zero. 
  39This pair of equations has a slightly different form from that described in Section 5.1. But it 
effectively has the form that monetary and fiscal policy can each, separately, affect both output 
and inflation, which is the key feature of the system described by equations (1) and (2) in Dixit 
and Lambertini (2000).  
 
Such a setup is a generalisation of our model in the following sense.  If we set A = 0, so that fiscal 
and  monetary  policy  only  affect  inflation  via  their  effect  on  demand,  and  so  are  “perfect 
substitutes” in the control of output and inflation, then we get a model which is precisely a static 
simplification  of  our  own  model.  (It  is  of  course  a  simplification  since  it  contains  no  debt 
equation.)  
 
The objectives of the two policymakers can be written as 
 
* + * +
2 2 2 1
2
i i i L y y & - 5 # $ " $ g  
 
where, as in the main text,  B C m,f,b i #  stands for monetary, fiscal and benevolent.  
 
Expected inflation &
e is exogenous (since expectations are formed before the shock draw), and the 
shocks %  and ( are also exogenous. 
 
C.2  Optimal Outcomes in Three Regimes 
 
It is straightforward to derive the first order conditions (FOCs) for each of the three regimes:  
 
 (i) Nash equilibrium,  
(ii) Fiscal-Leadership equilibrium,  
(iii) the two policymakers with identical objectives jointly minimise the common loss function 
(Cooperation),  
 
We can write down formulae for the reaction functions which emerge from each of these three 
sets of FOCs.  Note that reaction functions can be either written in terms of variables (inflation 
and output), or in terms of instruments (real interest rate and government expenditure). We give 
both. These reaction functions are plotted in Figure 7. The left hand side panels plot reactions in 
inflation-output space and the right hand side panels plot them in instrument space. 
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If the authorities cooperate, then the two instruments are chosen jointly from a single set of first 
order conditions. We have split this set into two subsets of first order conditions, in each of which 
the optimal outcome for one policy instrument is shown as a function of the value of the other 
policy instrument. This enables us to present the solutions for the two policy instruments as two 
reaction functions. Having such a representation is convenient for comparison of the results with 
those for the Nash equilibrium and for Fiscal Leadership. 
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The reaction functions plotted in Figure 7 are similar to those plotted in Dixit and Lambertini 
(2000).  We  plot  these  reaction  functions  for  both  the  Nash-equilibrium  case  and  the  Fiscal-
Leadership-equilibrium case, in both variable space and instrument space. The point where they 
intersect is either the Nash equilibrium, denoted by “N”, or the Fiscal Leadership equilibrium, 
denoted by “FL”. We also depict the cooperative equilibrium, which is denoted by “C”.  
 
C.3  A Special Case: A = 0   
 
Note that if we put A = 0 then, as noted above, the model amounts to a static version of the model 
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Fiscal Leadership 
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We plot the reaction functions and the resulting equilibria for these three regimes, in this special 
case, in the upper part of Figure 7. We can see three things. 
(i)   In  all  three  regimes  the  outcomes  for  inflation  and  output  are  the  same.  This  is  a 
consequence of the fact that the policy instruments are perfect substitutes in the control of 
output and inflation. (That this is the case can be verified from the formulae above, after 
noting that -m=-b and ym=yb,.) 
(ii)   In the Nash game, when the fiscal authorities have distorted objectives, they will wish for 
higher  output  than  if  they  were  benevolent.  We  can  use  the  first  row  of  Figure  7  to 
describe what then happens, by means of a virtual thought experiment. We start at point C 
in  both  boxes  of  the  first  row,  which  we  would  be  at  if  the  fiscal  authorities  were 
benevolent. A non-benevolent fiscal authority will increase g, above zero, even although 
this is costly, to reach its reaction function (which lies above the plotted region in the 
right-hand box). Monetary policy will then be tightened in order to fight the resulting 
inflation. But because the instruments are perfect substitutes this will return the economy 
right back to C in the left-hand box, but of course we will lie to the northeast of C in the 
right-hand box. The fiscal authorities will then expand in reply. This “civil war” between 
the two authorities will continue until the cost of raising g further becomes prohibitive. 
The two reaction functions intersect far to the right and above outside the plotted area in 
the right hand box. There is no debt in this model but if there was then this civil war 
would result in catastrophic consequences for debt, as in the model presented in the main 
body of this paper.  
(iii)   Fiscal leadership will, however, replicate the cooperative equilibrium in the instrument 
space (providing that the monetary authorities are benevolent, as we assume). Thus, even 
if  fiscal  authorities  are  not  benevolent,  the  outcome  when  there  is  fiscal  leadership 
completely replicates the cooperative equilibrium which emerges when both policymakers 
are benevolent. This is because, when the fiscal authorities lead, they know that if they 
increase  g  in  order  to  increase  output,  the  monetary  authority  would  then  completely 
counteract their policy. They will therefore not do this.  
These are essentially simple static versions of the results of the present paper, as reported in 
Section 4.  
 
 
  43C.4  The more general case: A   0  
 
These results do not hold in a model with A $ 0. In this more general case the potential for conflict 
between the policy authorities is modified. This is fundamentally because when authorities are 
benevolent and cooperate, the interest rate can be raised to fight inflation, and there can then be 
fiscal expansion to offset the recession which these higher interest rates would create, without 
fully removing the effects on inflation of the higher interest rate. As a result, that both r and g will 
be raised more than when A=0, inflation will be much lower, and output will be much higher. The 
equilibrium, is denoted by the letter C in the lower parts of Figure 7.  If we had debt in this model, 
then it would rise more than in the case of cooperation when A=0. 
 
In the Nash game, when the fiscal authorities have distorted objectives, they can expand by more 
than they would if they were benevolent. They will thus create more inflation. Monetary policy 
will then contract  more than if they were benevolent, in order to fight this resulting inflation. The 
fiscal  authorities  will  expand  in  reply,  and  this  continues  until  the  cost  of  raising  g  further 
becomes prohibitive. But the battle between the policymakers will much less severe than when A 
= 0, because the higher inflation which the fiscal authorities cause is much more easily removed 
by the resulting increase in r. Overall,  the outcomes of this Nash game are clearly much less bad 
than they would be when A=0. If we had debt in this model, then it would rise more than in the 
case of cooperation, but not nearly as much as in the Nash equilibrium when A=0. 
 
When the fiscal authorities lead, they know that if they expand in order to fight the recession, then 
the monetary policy will contract in order to fight the resulting inflation. But, unlike in the case 
when  A=0,  they  know  that  there  is  some  “mileage”  in  their  doing  this,  since  the  monetary 
authorities do not now need to fully remove the higher level of output in order to keep inflation 
low. As a result, the fiscal and monetary authorities will now fight each other, and we can see that 
they do this nearly as much as they would do in the Nash case.  Again, if we had debt in this 
model, it would rise more than in the case of cooperation, and nearly as much as in the Nash 
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Figure 7: Monetary and Fiscal Reaction Functions for the Static Model 
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